Abstract-Mobile ad hoc networks often support sensitive applications. These applications may require that users' identity, location, and correspondents be kept secret. This is a challenge in a MANET because of the cooperative nature of the network and broadcast nature of the communication media. In this paper, we propose a Privacy Preserving Communication System (PPCS) which provides a comprehensive solution to anonymize communication endpoints, keep the location and identifier of a node unlinkable, and mask the existence of communication flows. We present an analysis of the security of PPCS against passive internal attackers, provide a qualitative discussion on its strength against external attackers, and characterize its performance trade-offs. The simulation results demonstrate that PPCS has only 3% lower packet delivery ratio than existing multi-path routing protocols, while effectively providing privacy service in MANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
In MANETs, mobile nodes cooperate to forward data on behalf of each other. Typical protocols used for selforganizing and routing in these networks expose the node identifiers (network and link layer addresses), neighbors, and the end-points of communication. Some modes of operation further mandate that the nodes freely divulge their physical location. In short, nodes must advertise a profile of their online presence to participate in the MANETs. This is, in many cases, highly undesirable.
Both military and civilian MANETs may find the mandated exposure of information unacceptable. For example, in a military setting, identities of officers and soldiers, their locations, and their communication patterns are critically sensitive intelligence. Civilian applications have similar concerns. Consider students communicating on campus: it is neither desirable nor appropriate for students to expose who they are or where they are to the larger campus community.
Ideally, a node should be able to keep its identity, its location and its correspondents private, i.e., remain anonymous [4] , [22] , [23] . Any solution providing anonymity must overcome the broadcast nature of wireless environments (which enables eavesdropping) and operate under often tight resource constraints. Past "wired world" privacy solutions do not map well to MANETs because of the processing requirements they place on the nodes. Simple solutions like packet encryption are also largely ineffective because of ease of traffic analysis over a broadcast media. Hence, supporting privacy in MANETs is enormously challenging.
In this paper, we propose a Privacy Preserving Communication System (PPCS) which provides a comprehensive solution to anonymize communication end-points, keep the location and identifier of a node unlinkable, and mask the existence of communication flows.
To realize this level of privacy, we propose a series of lightweight cryptographic techniques. These are effective at combating eavesdropping by individual nodes. To further defend against more sophisticated collaborative attacks via traffic analysis, we introduce a resilient packet forwarding scheme. To evaluate the effectiveness of PPCS, we define the optimal guessing strategy that may be used by one or more adversaries in cooperation and show that with PPCS, the probability of correctly guessing the source or destination of a flow is independent of the number of compromised nodes on the path. Even in this case, the adversary cannot confirm that it has guessed correctly, and it cannot learn the real identifier of the source or destination. To quantify the overhead of this solution, we perform extensive simulations that show that there is minimal impact on packet delivery. This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the network model and examines passive attacks. Section III presents an anonymous communication system (PPCS) . Section IV inspects the effectiveness of an adversary in PPCS. In Section V, we evaluate the performance impact of PPCS. In Section VI, we discuss the trade-offs of PPCS. Section VII reviews previous work on anonymity in Internet and MANETs.
II. NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL A. Network Model
We assume that the wireless interface between nodes is bidirectional, i.e., if node i hears the transmission of node j, then node j is also able to hear node i.
We assume that there exists a symmetric key management service to establish pair-wise keys between nodes, and that the source and destination establish symmetric keys prior to communications. Such services are well studied in ad hoc and sensor networks [8] , [28] , [3] , [7] , [16] Traffic analysis is often used to subvert anonymity [1] , [24] , [21] . In this attack, adversaries monitor packet transmission to infer important information such as a source, destination, and source-destination pair. We consider the following traffic analysis attacks in this work: Packet Tracing Attack: A packet may be traced from source to destination by eavesdropping the transmission of the same packet as it traverses the network. Note that the adversary need not be able to recover the packet content to infer the source and destination of the flow. Packet Counting Attack: Eavesdropping nodes collaborate to discover a path by overhearing and simply "counting" packets that traverse nodes. In a network with low load, this is a straight-forward way to discern data paths.
Timing Attack: Adversaries may analyze the time correlation between packets passing through nodes to discover a flow [15] . If two adversaries perform this analysis and compare results, they may infer a source-destination pair. TTL Attack: Adversaries exploit the packet time-to-live (TTL) field to discover the destination. The value of the TTL field in a packet is set by a source to limit the number of hops a packet takes in the network. Every Since each node must perform the trapdoor check, it is important for the check to be efficient. The initial flow pseudonyms, PDO and Pso, of the forward and backward flows are generated by using the symmetric key and real identifiers of the source and destination. Either a source or a destination can change the flow pseudonym at anytime. To do this, subsequent flow pseudonyms are generated based on the previous flow pseudonym using forward chaining as follows:
, where f is a cryptographic keyed one-way hash function (HMAC [13] ). The results of function f appear random to the intermediate nodes. The trapdoor check is very lightweight, consisting only of computing a hash and a simple search for a matching node. Also note that the trapdoor check only occurs when processing the RREQ message; once the flow has been routed, the check is not required for forwarding subsequent packets. To further improve the efficientcy of the trapdoor check in each node, an optimal data structure such as binary search tree can be used.
B. Random Node Identification
Location privacy requires node identity and location to be unlinkable and untraceable. We propose to use a random node identifier to dissociate a real node identifier from location information. In normal operation, a mobile node has two addresses: a layer 2 address (MAC address) and a layer 3 address (node identifier).
Every node in the network generates random layer 3 and MAC addresses, referred to as random node identifiers (RNI), and advertises itself using its RNI via a message such as a HELLO message in AODV [19] . Neighboring nodes know each other only through their RNIs. The RNI is locally used for routing and communicating with neighboring nodes.
Each node changes its RNI after a random interval to prevent an adversary from learning its location and then starts advertising itself with the new RNI. The protocol to change RNI is the same as for an update due to mobility.
Since the source and destination associate with one another using end-to-end flow psuedonyms described in the previous subsection, they do not have to know each other's RNI. This has two benefits. First, the RNI may be changed without end-to-end coordination. Second, since the source and destination do not know each other's RNI, the communication between a source and destination does not disclose the location of either party to the other.
Due to the randomness and independence of the new and old RNI, an adversary cannot trace the changes of node RNI. One risk with this approach is identifier collision, in which two nodes choose the same RNI, might occur. However, the probability that two nodes generate the same RNI (MAC address (48 Multi-path routing protocols have been proposed for improving reliability and providing quality of service in ad hoc networks [14] , [17] , [26] . These multi-path routing protocols establish link/node disjoint paths to distribute traffic to avoid congestion. However, node/link disjoint paths are also vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks. Collaborating eavesdroppers may easily obtain exact packet counts and reconstruct the end-to-end paths. To resolve these vulnerabilities and establish a sufficient number of multiple paths, we relax the node/link disjointness condition present in most multi-path routing protocols. By allowing non-disjoint paths, MPRF diffuses traffic in an irregular manner making traffic analysis more difficult, i.e., requiring a larger number of colluders. In addition, when a node selects multiple paths, the most recently joined node is not be chosen since compromised nodes can continuously change their identifiers to hamper the communication (Denial Of Service). Hint: Although a packet is encrypted by a source, if the encrypted packet is transmitted without any modification on each link, it is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks which determine a data path by observing the incoming and outgoing packets of nodes. To address this problem, the encrypted packet is transformed on a hop-by-hop basis.
To make the hop-by-hop transformation more efficient and anonymous, we propose an HMAC [13] Random Time-To-Live (RTTL): The TTL field is used for discarding packets which have not found a destination and circulated through the network. In MANETs, the TTL is set to the length of a path by a source node. Each node on the path decreases the value by 1. Thus, the TTL value reveals the position of a node on a path from a source or a destination. The receiver anonymity set may be reduced to a set of nodes neighboring a compromised node from a set of all possible receivers.
To prevent compromised nodes from learning their position on a path, we propose a Random Time-To-Live (RTTL). A source node generates a random value and sets the TTL field with the sum of this random value and path length, RTTL. The RTTL should be less than the maximum hop count (Network diameter). The source includes the initial random value in the encrypted data packet. Intermediate nodes decrease the TTL value of a packet by 1 as they do in the normal packet forwarding. This TTL field does not release the absolute position of a node due to the random value. A destination decrypts the received packet and checks if the received RTTL is valid by subtracting its initial random value.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In Section II-B, we presented a classification of attackers. In this section, we characterize the anonymity provided by PPCS against attacks by internal compromised nodes and then argue informally about the anonymity provided by our system against eavesdropping attacks. To support this analysis, we present an optimal guessing strategy to be used by an adversary for each attack.
A. Internal Attackers
In this subsection we examine the effectiveness of PPCS against collaborating internal adversarial nodes. Intermediate nodes on the path can see the flow pseudonym and TTL field of a packet. Intermediate nodes also know the previous and next hop nodes of a packet on the routing path. Using this information, the compromised intermediate nodes on a path collude to make an educated guess as to the source and destination of a flow.
To characterize the probability that a set of internal compromised nodes collaborate on successfully discovering anonymity we first derive a general equation which can be applied to each case of anonymity (source/destination and communicating pair). Let P(A = s) and P(A = r) denote the probability that an adversary discovers a source or a destination. Note that the adversary can determine only which node is a source or a destination, not the identifier due to the random node and flow identification schemes. Since the values, P(A = s) and P(A = r), are the same, we discuss the probability P(A = s) below. Let P(A = (s,r)) denote the probability that an adversary discovers the source and destination pair. 1) Generalization: Without loss of generality, we assume that the probability of a compromised node being able to exploit a vulnerability is dependent on its position on a path. In particular, the first and last hop nodes on a path may have a higher probability of finding a source or destination, respectively, than an intermediate node on the path depending on the characteristics of the security solution. To this end we derive the probability of four cases of node compromise as in Table IV-A.1. We determine the probabilities of P(CH), P(HC), P(CC), and P(HH) for a path that has k compromised nodes in each case. P(CH) P(HC)
Let PCH PHC Pcc PHH denote the probability that an 
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In these equations, P(A X) is the probability that anonymity is discovered given that the compromise scenario X has occurred. The probability that an adversary discovers target anonymity is defined P(A) = PCH + PCC + PHC + PHH (1) This is a measure of the effectiveness of compromised nodes. In disjoint multi-paths environments, the probability that an adversary discovers anonymity is Pm(A) = -(1 -P(A))R (2) where R is the number of disjoint paths established between the source and destination.
2) Optimal Guessing Strategy: We now present the optimal strategy that an adversary may use to discover flow endpoints (a source, a destination, or both). First, consider an optimal anonymity solution in which no information is leaked. In this case a compromised node does not know its previous or next hops, or its position on a path. It only knows of other compromised nodes. In this situation, the best an adversary can do is to guess the source from the set of uncompromised nodes. The probability of guessing correctly is (NIC)-Now consider a non-ideal anonymity solution in which an adversary can identify its position on the path, but not other nodes on the path except for its direct previous and next hops. If the node is the first hop (information learned by seeing the TTL in the reverse path), it knows its previous hop is the traffic source. If a node is not the first hop on a path, its best guess is a random choice of all nodes in the network not counting the nodes it knows to be compromised or the nodes that compromised nodes can rule out as the source, such as their next hop nodes or previous hop nodes if they are not the first on the path. We call this set U, which has G = N-C -T members. Thus the probability of an intermediate node guessing correctly is Finally, consider the situation when RTTL is used within PPCS. In this case an adversary knows it is on the path, but cannot tell its position on the path. Therefore, a different guessing strategy will be used. The adversaries have two choices. First, they can make a random guess of all nodes in set U, in which case their chance of guessing correctly is G. A better strategy is simply to guess its previous hop as being the source. Although the adversary does not know its place on the path, it has a chance of being the first hop node and thus guessing correctly. Even if several nodes on the path are compromised and collaborate, the only information they can learn is which adversary is closest to the source, and guess the previous hop to that node, i.e., they will all guess the same node. This strategy results in a probability of guessing the source that approaches L, independent of the number of compromised nodes on the path. The only way that the random guess strategy will be better for an individual node is if G < L, i.e., the average path length is greater than the number of uncompromised nodes in the network which is an unlikely scenario.
Based on the discussion above, we assume the following three strategies to guess the source node on a path: (1) In an ideal environment, adversaries make a random guess from the set of non-compromised nodes; (2) If an adversary is on a path, and it knows its position on the path, it will guess its previous hop as the source if it is the first hop node, otherwise it will make a random choice from the set U; (3) If an adversary is on a path, and it does not know its position on the path, it will always guess its previous hop on the path as the source.
3) Source/Destination Anonymity: Compromised internal nodes collaborate to determine a source using explicit information such as the flow pseudonym, TTL value, and next and previous hop nodes.
Let us suppose that there is more than one compromised node on a routing path. These nodes conspire to discover a source of traffic. Pfp8 and Pi,, are the probabilities that the first hop and intermediate nodes guess a source, respectively. The probability P(A = s) is
The first two terms correspond to the first two terms in equation 1 and Pi,, = 0 which is used to compute Pm(A = s). Figure 1 shows the effectiveness of compromised nodes in a disjoint multiple-path environment. An adversary has a higher probability of guessing the source in a multiple disjoint path environment since more information may be open to more compromised nodes.
However, MPRF uses multiple non-disjoint paths. Thus every intermediate node may have multiple forward and backward hops for a flow. Furthermore, the first hop node on one path may be a non-first hop node on a different path of which it is a part. These multiple incoming links increase the number of choices for guessing, and hence reduce the probability of an adversary guessing correctly. In Figure 2 , the addition of each dotted link increases the incoming degree of the corresponding nodes(l, 4, 7, and 8). From this, we can compute the average incoming degree of a node, w , where W is the number of nodes on disjoint multipaths and i is the number of added directed links. Figure 1 (a) compares the probability that an adversary may guess a source in disjoint multi-path and non-disjoint multipath environments where 4 disjoint multipaths exist and the average path length is 5. This result demonstrates that MPRF in PPCS reduces the effectiveness of an adversary.
In summary, Table II shows the effect of using PPCS on the probability that intermediate and first hop nodes guess a source correctly. For destination anonymity, the analysis and equations are similar.
4) Source and Destination Unlinkability: If the path between a source and destination is known, the source and destination pair is also discovered. The probability that an adversary discovers the source and destination pair in a single path environment is P(A=(s, r)) = P(A=(s, r) CH)P(CH) + P(A=(s, r) HC)P(HC) + P(A=(s, r) CC)P(CC) + P(A=(s, r) HH)P(HH)
P.,, denotes the probability that nodes en route guess the source and destination pair. As discussed in the previous section, if an adversary knows its position on a path, the probability that the first/last hop node determines a source or a destination is 1 . The probability that other intermediate nodes guess a source/destination becomes G, since intermediate nodes know that their previous/next hop is not the source/destination and may guess one node of a set of possible sources/destinations. Therefore, if intermediate nodes know their position, Pf+i,l and Pi+',, are GPi+i, is (G)2, and Pf l,l is 1.
If the adversary does not know its position on a path because of RTTL, the same guessing strategy as previously discussed is used. Thus, Pf +l,l is 1, and Pi+f ,l Pi+l,l Pi+i, become 0.
By extending the above single path case to a disjoint multi-path, the probability of discovering the source and destination pair is Pm (A = (s, r)) = (1 -P(A (s, r)))R (6) In disjoint multi-path environments, intermediate nodes have the same probability as the single path to guess the source and destination pair. Figure 1 (b) shows the probability that an adversary discovers the communicating pair in a disjoint multi-path environment.
In a non-disjoint multi-path environment, we can apply the same reasoning as for the source anonymity case to determine that Pf+l,l is ( W$)2 and Pi+f,1Pi+±,i Pi+i,1 become 0.
As Figure 1 (b) shows, an adversary has a lower probability to discover the communicating pair in nondisjoint multi-path environments than disjoint multi-path environments. This verifies that MPRF of PPCS mitigates the effectiveness of internal compromised nodes, while providing defense against eavesdropping attacks.
B. Eavesdropping
Since nodes in MANETs share a common broadcast channel, they overhear all communication within transmission range. Hence, an adversary may learn information by collecting and analyzing overheard data without revealing its existence. A set of local eavesdroppers form a global eavesdropper to cover a path. They may have a dedicated communication channel to exchange information.
In PPCS, every node en route uses the Hint to prevent correlation between forwarded packets and locally broadcasts the transformed packet. The eavesdroppers may not learn which node is the local sender and receiver of a packet, due to the local broadcasting and hop-by-hop transformation of packets. This limits eavesdroppers from obtaining information about the relationship between the incoming and outgoing packet of a node.
MPRF in PPCS spreads traffic over multiple paths, preventing eavesdroppers from learning the source, destination, or communicating pair by counting broadcast packets. Eavesdroppers located in different areas see different amounts of broadcast traffic with varying delay. Thus, a global eavesdropper is unable to discover significant information about node identity or flows.
To fully characterize eavesdropping requires a model of traffic that encompasses the amount of information an adjacent eavesdropping node can observe, and distribution of information sent through that victim and intermediate nodes, and the frequency and structure of the underlying traffic. We are currently developing a analytical model for this exceedingly complex environment.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effect of PPCS on the performance of routing and data transmission. We performed our simulation in the ns2 simulator [9] . Specifically, we evaluate the effect of MPRF in which multiple paths are established and each packet on a flow may take a different path.
As a baseline multi-path routing protocol we use ad hoc on-demand multipath distance vector routing (AOMDV) [17] . To implement MPRF, we modified Figure 3 (a) shows that the packet delivery ratio is decreased 3% and 5% in S-MPRF and MPRF, respectively. This result shows that the impact of changing node pseudonyms is small. The fact that multiple paths are susceptible to breaking for each flow, increases the routing overhead required to overcome these failures. As shown in Figure 3 (c), there is a 42% increase in routing overhead in MPRF over AOMDV.
In traditional routing protocols, packets are transmitted on the shortest path. With MPRF packets are randomly distributed to across multiple paths. Because some paths will be longer than the shortest path, the end-to-end packet delay will increase. Figure 3 (b) shows a 51% increase in packet delivery delay in MPRF and S-MPRF. We discuss the trade-offs between the security and performance in the next section.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the trade-offs of MPRF. According to the analysis in Section IV-A, as the number of paths increases, the probability of an internal adversary compromising anonymity increases. While using nondisjoint paths is better than using disjoint paths, both are less secure against internal attackers.
Although a single path solution is more secure against internal compromised nodes, it is less secure against eavesdroppers. To combat these attacks, it is better to establish more paths to distribute traffic. As an extreme example, if a packet is broadcast over the entire network (the number of multiple paths is infinite), eavesdroppers may not discover a flow at all. Based on a security perspective alone, the choice of using MPRF should be based on a risk analysis of the network. If an attacker is more likely to be external, MPRF should be used. If the attacker is more likely to be internal, it should not.
If MPRF is to be used, the packet forwarding performance of the network will decrease as discussed in V. Disjoint multi-path forwarding provides better packet delivery ratio (3-5%) than the non-disjoint multi-path forwarding used in MPRF. In non-disjoint multi-path environments, an intermediate node may receive packets of a flow from multiple neighbors which may cause more collisions on the wireless interface. However, given that the difference in performance is small, using MPRF is advisable as it does improve security as shown in Figure 1 .
VII. RELATED WORK
A great deal of previous research has focused on providing confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data in MANETs, but anonymity remains an open problem. Pfitzman and Hansen [20] define general terminologies of anonymity. In their article, anonymity is defined as "state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set. " Chaum's [4] pioneering anonymity solution introduces a mix or a series of mixes (mix network) into a network for hiding communicating endpoints [10] in the Internet. A source selects the route (set of mixes) and encrypts data packets with the public key of each mix in reverse order (from last mix to the first mix). Each mix peels off one layer by decrypting the received packet with its private key and forwarding it to the next hop. The last mix processes the packet in the same way and transmits it to the destination.
Onion routing [22] is built on a mix-net approach. An onion consists of next hop information and an onion for the next hop. Each intermediate onion router decrypts the received message with its private key to get the next hop and onion for the next hop. The last onion peels off its layer and transmits the encrypted data to the destination.
Tor [6] extended onion routing with features that provide forward secrecy.
Mix-nets are not applicable to MANETs, because the resource demands of the underlying public key operations are too expensive for mobile nodes with energy and computation limitations. Moreover, with high mobility, it is not easy to maintain the full path from the source.
In Crowds [23] , groups of users (called crowds) cooperate to ensure client anonymity in web systems, e.g., web-browsing. Jundos run by each client decide randomly if they should relay the packet to another jundo or transmit it to the web server directly. All users in the group share their symmetric keys to encrypt the relayed packet. Hordes [18] is based on Crowds and proposes to use multicast routing to provide initiator anonymity. Brent [25] proposes receiver anonymity based on incomparable public keys and multicast. In MANETs, however, the maintenance cost of multicast is known to be high.
Most solutions proposed for the Internet use a proxy function (Mix, Jundo, and Onion Router) to provide anonymity. In MANETs, Jian et al. [11] propose a dynamic mix method that accommodates dynamic topology changes. Blaze et al. propose WAR [2] , in which anonymous routing is combined with a key distribution protocol and an onion routing structure. However, in MANETs, it is not feasible to form a set of proxy functions since mobile nodes all play an equal role. In civilian applications of MANETs, in particular, mobile nodes may not cooperate to play the larger role of a proxy.
J. Kong and X. Hong [12] apply MIX-Net to MANETs by using symmetric key cryptography to provide anonymity. This approach uses a cryptographic trapdoor within a broadcast message to hide the identifiers of local intermediate nodes and the destination. However, in a situation in which adversaries are located on each link, they may simply monitor the transmission to determine who is broadcasting and how many packets are being broadcast.
Recently, Zhang et al. proposed MASK [27] in which a Trusted Authority (TA) assigns a large number of random identifiers and a set of corresponding secret points to each node sufficient for the lifetime of a node. 
